Despite extensive research on cryptography, secure and efficient query processing over outsourced data remains an open challenge. We develop communication-efficient and information-theoretically secure algorithms for privacy-preserving aggregation queries using multi-party computation (MPC). Specifically, query processing techniques over secret-shared data outsourced by single or multiple database owners are developed. These algorithms allow a user to execute queries on the secret-shared database and also prevent the network and the (adversarial) clouds to learn the user's queries, results, or the database. We further develop (non-mandatory) privacypreserving result verification algorithms that detect malicious behaviors, and experimentally validate the efficiency of our approach over large datasets, the size of which prior approaches to secretsharing or MPC systems have not scaled to.
INTRODUCTION
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This work is licensed under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. For any use beyond those covered by this license, obtain permission by emailing info@vldb.org. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to the VLDB Endowment. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, Vol. 12, No. 9 ISSN 2150-8097. DOI: https://doi.org/10.14778/3329772.3329779 cryptographic mechanism in polynomial time. Non-deterministic encryption [31] , homomorphic encryption (HE) [29] , orderpreserving encryption (OPE) [9] , and searchable-encryption [41] are examples of such techniques. HE mixed with oblivious-RAM (ORAM) offers the most computationally secure mechanisms. Information-theoretically secure techniques that are unconditionally secure and independent of adversary's computational capabilities. Shamir's secret-sharing (SSS) [40] is a well-known information-theoretically secure protocol. In SSS, multiple (secure) shares of a dataset are kept at mutually suspicious servers, such that a single server cannot learn anything about the data. Secret-sharing-based techniques are secure under the assumption that a majority of the servers (equal to the threshold of the secretsharing mechanism) do not collude. Secret-sharing mechanisms also have applications in other areas such as Byzantine agreement, secure multiparty computations (MPC), and threshold cryptography, as discussed in [12] .
The computationally/information-theoretically secure database techniques can also be broadly classified into two categories, based on the supported queries: (i) Techniques that support selection/join: Different cryptographic techniques are built for selection queries, e.g., searchable encryption, deterministic/non-deterministic encryption, and OPE; and (ii) Techniques that support aggregation: Cryptographic techniques that exploit homomorphic mechanisms such as homomorphic encryption, SSS, or MPC techniques.
While both computationally and information-theoretically secure techniques have been studied extensively in the cryptographic domain, secure data management has focused disproportionately on computationally secure techniques (e.g., OPE, homomorphic encryption, searchable-encryption, and bucketization [33] ) resulting in systems such as CryptDB [38] , Monomi [43] , MariaDB [1] , CorrectDB [11] ). Some exceptions to the above include [25, 26, 45, 24] that have focused on secret-sharing.
Recently, both academia and industries have begun to explore information-theoretically secure techniques using MPC that efficiently supports OLAP tasks involving aggregation queries, while achieving higher security than computationally secure techniques. 1 For instance, commercial systems, such as Jana [10] by Galois, Pulsar [3] by Stealth Software, Sharemind [13] by Cybernetica, and products by companies such as Unbound Tech., Partisia, Secret Double Octopus, and SecretSkyDB Ltd. have explored MPC-based databases systems that offer strong security guarantees. Benefits of MPC-based methods in terms of both higher-level of security and relatively efficient support for aggregation queries have been extensively discussed in both scientific articles [39, 27, 21, 37] and popular media [4, 5, 6, 7] .
Much of the above work on MPC-based secure data management requires several servers to collaborate to answer queries. These collaborations require several rounds of communication among noncolluding servers. Instead, we explore secure data management based on SSS that does not require servers to collaborate to generate answers and can, hence, be implemented more efficiently. There is prior work on exploring secret-sharing for SQL processing [25, 26, 45, 24] , but the developed techniques suffer from several drawbacks, e.g., weak security guarantees such as leakage of access patterns, significant overhead of maintaining polynomials for generating shares at the database (DB) owner, no support for third-party query execution on the secret-shared outsourced database, etc. We discuss the limitations of existing secret-sharing-based data management techniques in details in §2.2.
Our contributions in this paper are twofold: 1. SSS-based algorithms (entitled OBSCURE) that support a large class of access-pattern-hiding aggregation queries with selection. OBSCURE supports count, sum, average, maximum, minimum, top-k, and reverse top-k, queries, without revealing anything about data/query/results to an adversary. 2. An oblivious result verification algorithm for aggregation queries such that an adversary does not learn anything from the verification. OBSCURE's verification step is not mandatory. A querier may run verification occasionally to confirm the correctness of results. 3. A comprehensive experimental evaluation of OBSCURE on variety of queries that clearly highlight its scalability to moderate size datasets and its efficiency compared to both state-of-the-art MPCbased solutions, as well as, to the simple strategy of downloading encrypted data at the client, decrypting it, and running queries at the (trusted) client. OBSCURE is designed to work both in situations when a single DB owner or when multiple DB owners outsource their data for others (queriers) to analyze. Example of a scenario with a single DB owner might be a hospital's patient DB outsourcing [8] to allow researchers to analyze the data. Example of a scenario with multiple DB owners might be utility owners outsourcing their smart meter data to enable others to analyze their utility consumptions as compared the average utility consumed by households in the region.
Outline of the paper. §2 provides an overview of secret-sharing techniques and related work. §3 and §4 provide the model, an adversary model, security properties, and data outsourcing model. §5 provides conjunctive/disjunctive count queries and their verification algorithm. §6 provides conjunctive/disjunctive sum queries and their verification algorithm. §7 provides an algorithm for fetching tuples having maximum values in some attributes with their verification. §8 provides an experimental evaluation. Full version. Due to space limitations, we could not describe several technical details of OBSCURE, which can be found in the full version [32] . These include: detailed applications of OBSCURE, an approach for finding maximum over SSS databases outsourced by multiple DB owners, approaches for the minimum and top-k, an example of count query verification on secret-shares, an example of signbit computation on secret-shares, security proofs, a communication-efficient strategy for determining which tuples satisfied a query predicate, and range-queries evaluation.
BACKGROUND
Here, we provide an overview of secret-sharing with an example and compare our proposed approach with existing works.
Building Blocks
OBSCURE is based on SSS, string-matching operations over SSS, and order-preserving secret-sharing, discussed below.
Shamir's secret-sharing (SSS). In SSS [40] , the DB owner divides a secret value, say S, into c different fragments, called shares, and sends each share to a set of c non-communicating participants/servers. These servers cannot know the secret S until they collect c < c shares. In particular, the DB owner randomly selects a polynomial of degree c with c random coefficients, i.e., f (x) = a0 + a1x + a2x
, p is a prime number, Fp is a finite field of order p, a0 = S, and ai ∈ N(1 ≤ i ≤ c ). The DB owner distributes the secret S into c shares by placing x = 1, 2, . . . , c into f (x). The secret can be reconstructed based on any c + 1 shares using Lagrange interpolation [19] . Note that c ≤ c, where c is often taken to be larger than c to tolerate malicious adversaries that may modify the value of their shares. For this paper, however, since we are not addressing the availability of data, we will consider c and c to be identical.
SSS allows an addition of shares, i.e., if s(a)i and s(b)i are shares of two values a and b, respectively, at the server i, then the server i can compute an addition of a and b itself, i.e., a + b = s(a) + s(b), without knowing real values of a and b. String-matching operation on secret-shares.
AccumulatingAutomata (AA) [23] is a new string-matching technique on secretshares that do not require servers to collaborate to do the operation, unlike MPC-techniques [15, 22, 35, 14, 13, 10] . Here, we explain AA to show string-matching operations on secret-shares.
Let D be the cleartext data. Let S(D)i (1 ≤ i ≤ c) be the i th secret-share of D stored at the i th server, and c be the number of non-communicating servers. AA allows a user to search a pattern, pt, by creating c secret-shares of pt (denoted by S(pt)i, 1 ≤ i ≤ c), so that the i th server can search the secret-shared pattern S(pt)i over S(D)i. The result of the string-matching operation is either 1 of secret-share form, if S(pt)i matches with a secret-shared string in S(D)i or 0 of secret-share form; otherwise. Note that when searching a pattern on the servers, AA uses multiplication of shares, as well as, additive property of SSS, which will be clear by the following example. If the user wishes to search a pattern of length l in only one communication round, while the DB owner and the user are using a polynomial of degree one, then due to multiplication of shares, the final degree of the polynomial will be 2l, and solving such a polynomial will require at least 2l + 1 shares. Example. Assume that the domain of symbols has only three symbols, namely A, B, and C. Thus, A can be represented as 1, 0, 0 . Similarly, B and C can be represented as 0, 1, 0 and 0, 0, 1 , respectively. DB owner side. Suppose that the DB owner wants to outsource B to the (cloud) servers. Hence, the DB owner may represent B as its unary representation: 0, 1, 0 . If the DB owner outsources the vector 0, 1, 0 to the servers, it will reveal the symbol. Thus, the DB owner uses any three polynomials of an identical degree, as shown in Table 1 , to create three shares. User-side. Suppose that the user wishes to search for a symbol B. The user will first represent B as a unary vector, 0, 1, 0 , and then, create secret-shares of B, as shown in Table 2 . Note that there is no need to ask the DB owner to send any polynomials to create shares or ask the DB owner to execute the search query. Server-side. Each server performs position-wise multiplication of the vectors that they have, adds all the multiplication resultants, and sends them to the user, as shown in Table 3 . An important point to note here is that the server cannot deduce the keyword, as well as, the data by observing data/query/results. User-side. After receiving the outputs ( y1 = 43, y2 = 147, y3 = 313 ) from the three servers, the user executes Lagrange interpolation [19] to construct the secret answer, as follows:
The final answer is 1 that confirms that the secret-shares at the servers have B. Note. In this paper, we use AA that utilizes unary representation as a building block. A recent paper Prio [20] also uses a unary representation; however, we use significantly fewer number of bits compared to Prio's unary representation. One can use Prio's unary representation too or use a different private string-matching technique over secret-shares. Order-preserving secret-sharing (OP-SS). The concept of OP-SS was introduced in [25] . OP-SS maintains the order of the values in secret-shares too, e.g., if v1 and v2 are two values in cleartext such that v1 < v2, then S(v1) < S(v2) at any server. It is clear that finding records with maximum or minimum values using OP-SS is trivial. However, ordering revealed by OP-SS can leak more information about records. Consider, for instance, an employee relation, shown in Table 4 on page 5. For ease of exposition, we represent Table 4 in cleartext. In Table 4 , the salary field can be stored using OP-SS. If we know (background knowledge) that employees in the security department earn more money than others, we can infer from the representation that the second tuple corresponds to someone from the security department. Thus, OP-SS, by itself, offers little security. However, as we will see later in §7, by splitting the fields such as salary that can be stored using OP-SS, while storing other fields using SSS, we can benefit from the ordering supported by OP-SS without compromising security.
Comparison with Existing Work
Comparison with SSS databases. In 2006, Emekçi et al. [25] introduced the first work on SSS data for executing sum, maximum, and minimum queries. However, [25] uses a trusted-thirdparty to perform queries and is not secure, since it uses OP-SS to answer maximum/minimum queries. Another paper by Emekçi et al. [26] on OP-SS based aggregation queries requires the database (DB) owner to retain each polynomial, which was used to create database shares, resulting in the DB owner to store n × m polynomials, where n and m are the numbers of tuples and attributes in a relation. [26] is also not secure, since it reveals access-patterns (i.e., the identity of tuples that satisfy a query) and using OP-SS. Like [26] , [45] proposed a similar approach and also suffers from similar disadvantages. [42] proposed SSS-based sum and average queries; however, they also require the DB owner to retain tuple-ids of qualifying tuples. [24] used a novel string-matching operation 2 While [25, 26, 24, 10] have explored mechanisms to support selection and join operations over the secret-shared data, these techniques are not secure (e.g., leak information from access-patterns), are inefficient (often requiring quadratic computations), and require transmitting entire dataset to users. SS can primarily be used to support OLAP style aggregation queries, which is our focus in this paper.
over the shares at the server, but it cannot perform general aggregations with selection over complex predicates. In short, all the SSS-based solutions for aggregation queries either overburden the DB owner (by storing enough data related to polynomials and fully participating in a query execution), are insecure due to OP-SS, reveal access-patterns, or support a very limited form of aggregation queries without any selection criteria.
In contrast, OBSCURE eliminates all such limitations. It provides a fully secure and efficient solution for implementing aggregation queries with selections. Our experimental results will show that OBSCURE scales to datasets with 6M tuples on TPC-H queries, the size of which prior secret-sharing and/or MPC-based techniques have never scaled to. The key to the efficient performance of OB-SCURE still is exploiting OP-SS -while OP-SS, in itself is not secure (it is prone to background knowledge attacks, for instance). The way OBSCURE uses OP-SS, as will be clear in §4, it prevents such attacks by appropriately partitioning data, while still being able to exploit OP-SS for efficiency. In addition, to support aggregation with selections, OBSCURE exploits the string-matching techniques over shares developed in [23] .
Furthermore, as we will see in experimental section ( §8), OB-SCURE scales to datasets with 6M tuples on TPC-H queries.
Comparison with MPC-techniques. OBSCURE also overcomes several limitations of existing MPC-based solutions. Recent work, Prio [20] supports a mechanism for confirming the maximum number, if the maximum number is known; however, Prio [20] does not provide any mechanism to compute the maximum/minimum. Also, Prio does not provide methods to execute conjunctive and disjunctive count/sum queries. Another recent work [14] deals with adding shares in an array under malicious servers and malicious users, using the properties of SSS and public-key settings. However, [14] is unable to execute a single dimensional, conjunctive, or disjunctive sum query. Note that (as per our assumption) though, [14] can tolerate malicious users, while OBSCURE is designed to only handle malicious servers, and it assumes users to be trustworthy.
Other works, e.g., Sepia [15] and [22] , perform addition and less than operations, and use many communication rounds. In contrast, OBSCURE uses minimal communication rounds between the user and each server, (when having enough shares). Specifically, count, sum, average, and their verification algorithms require at most two rounds between each server and the user. However, maximum/minimum finding algorithms require at most four communication rounds. In addition, our scheme achieves the minimum communication cost for aggregate queries, especially for count, sum, and average queries, by aggregating data locally at each server.
Comparison with MPC/SSS-based verification approaches. [35] and [42] developed verification approaches for secret-shared data. [35] considered verification process for MPC using a trusted-third-party verifier. While overburdening the DB owner by keeping metadata for each tuple, [42] provided metadata-based operation verification (i.e., whether all the desired tuples are scanned or not) for only sum queries, unlike OBSCURE's result verification for all queries. OBSCURE verification methods neither involve the DB owner to verify the results nor require a trusted-third-party verifier.
PRELIMINARY
This section provides a description of entities, an adversarial model, and security properties for obliviously executing queries.
The Model
We assume the following three entities in our model. 1. A set of c > 2 non-communicating servers. The servers do not exchange data with each other to compute any answer. The only possible data exchange of a server is with the user/querier or the database owner. 2. The trusted database (DB) owner, that creates c secret-shares of the data and transfers the i th share to the i th server. The secret-shares are created by an algorithm that supports non-interactive addition and multiplication of two shares, which is required to execute the private string-matching operation, at the server, as explained in §2. 3. An (authenticated, authorized, and trusted) user/querier, who executes queries on the secret-shared data at the servers. The query is sent to servers. The user fetches the partial outputs from the servers and performs a simple operation (polynomial interpolation using Lagrange polynomials [19] ) to obtain the secret-value.
Adversarial Model
We consider two adversarial models, in both of which the cloud servers (storing secret-shares) are not trustworthy. In the honest but curious model, the server correctly computes the assigned task without tampering with data or hiding answers. However, the server may exploit side information (e.g., query execution, background knowledge, and output size) to gain as much information as possible about the stored data. Such a model is considered widely in many cryptographic algorithms and in widely used in DaS [17, 33, 44, 46] . We also consider a malicious adversary that could deviate from the algorithm and delete tuples from the relation. Users and database owners, in contrast, are assumed to be not malicious.
Only authenticated users can request query on servers. Further, we follow the restriction of the standard SSS that the adversary cannot collude with all (or possibly the majority of) the servers. Thus, the adversary cannot generate/insert/update shares at the majority of the servers. Also, the adversary cannot eavesdrop on a majority of communication channels between the user and the servers. This can be achieved by either encrypting the traffic between user and servers, or by using anonymous routing [30] , in which case the adversary cannot gain knowledge of servers that store the secretshares. Note that if the adversary could either collude with or successfully eavesdrop on the communication channels between the majority of servers and user, the secret-sharing technique will not apply. 4 The validity of the assumptions behind secret-sharing have been extensively discussed in prior work [39, 27, 21, 37] . The adversary can be aware of the public information, such as the actual number of tuples and number of attributes in a relation, which will not affect the security of the proposed scheme, though such leakage can be prevented by adding fake tuples and attributes. 
Security Properties
In the above-mentioned adversarial model, an adversary wishes to learn the (entire/partial) data and query predicates. Hence, a secure algorithm must prevent an adversary to learn the data (i) by just looking the cryptographically-secure data and deduce the frequency of each value (i.e., frequency-count attacks), and (ii) when executing a query and deduce which tuples satisfy a query predicate (i.e., access-pattern attacks) and how many tuples satisfy a query 3 The choice of underlying non-interactive and string-matching-based secret-sharing mechanisms do not change our proposed aggregation and verification algorithms. 4 The DB owner/user can use anonymous routing to send their data to the servers, thereby preventing an adversary from determining which user is connecting to which server. If the adversary knows the majority of the communication channels/servers, then it can construct the secret-shared query, outputs to the query, and the database. 5 The adversary cannot launch any attack against the DB owner. We do not consider cyber-attacks that can exfiltrate data from the DB owner directly, since defending against generic cyber-attacks is outside the scope of this paper. predicate (i.e., output-size attacks). Thus, in order to prevent these attacks, our security definitions are identical to the standard security definition as in [16, 28, 18 ]. An algorithm is privacy-preserving if it maintains the privacy of the querier (i.e., query privacy), the privacy of data from the servers, and performs identical operations, regardless of the user query. Query/Querier's privacy requires that the user's query must be hidden from the server, the DB owner, and the communication channel. Also, the server cannot distinguish between two or more queries of the same type based on the output. Queries are of the same type based on their output size, e.g., all count queries are of the same type since they return almost an identical number of bits. Definition: Users privacy. For any probabilistic polynomial time adversarial server having a secret-shared relation S(R) and any two input query predicates, say p1 and p2, the server cannot distinguish p1 or p2 based on the executed computations for either p1 and p2. Privacy from the server requires that the stored input data, intermediate data during a computation, and output data are not revealed to the server, and the secret value can only be reconstructed by the DB owner or an authorized user. In addition, two or more occurrences of a value in the relation must be different at the server to prevent frequency analysis while data at rest. Recall that due to secret-shared relations (by following the approach given in §2.1), the server cannot learn the relations and frequency-analysis, and in addition, due to maintaining the query privacy, the server cannot learn the query and the output.
We, also, must ensure that the server's behavior must be identical for a given query, and the servers provide an identical answer to the same query, regardless of the users (recall that user might be different compared to the data owner in our model). To show that we need to compare the real execution of the algorithm at the servers against the ideal execution of the algorithm at a trusted party having the same data and the same query predicate. An algorithm maintains the data privacy from the server if the real and ideal executions of the algorithm return an identical answer to the user. Definition: Privacy from the server. For any given secret-shared relation S(R) at a server, any query predicate qp, and any real user, say U , there exists a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) user U in the ideal execution, such that the outputs to U and U for the query predicate qp on the relation S(R) are identical. Properties of verification. We provide verification properties against malicious behaviors. A verification method must be oblivious and find any misbehavior of the servers when computing a query. We follow the verification properties from [35] , as follows: (i) the verification method cannot be refuted by the majority of the malicious servers, and (ii) the verification method should not leak any additional information.
OBSCURE Overview
Let us introduce OBSCURE at a high-level. OBSCURE allows single-dimensional and multi-dimensional conjunctive/disjunctive equality-based aggregation queries. Note that the method of OB-SCURE for handling these types of queries is different from SQL, since OBSCURE does not support query optimization and indexing 6 due to secret-shared data. Further, OBSCURE handles range-based queries by converting the range into equality queries. Executing a query on OBSCURE requires four phases, as follows: PHASE 1: Data upload by DB owner(s). The DB owner uploads data to non-communicating servers using a secret-sharing mechanism that allows addition and multiplication (e.g., [23] ) at servers. PHASE 2: Query generation by the user. The user generates a query, creates secret-shares of the query predicate, and sends them to the servers. For generating secret-shares of the query predicate, the user follows the strategies given in §5 (count query), §6 (sum queries), §7 (maximum/minimum), and §5.1, §6.1 (verification). PHASE 3: Query processing by the servers. The servers process an input query in an oblivious manner such that neither the query nor the results satisfying the query are revealed to the adversary. Finally, the servers transfer their outputs to the user. PHASE 4: Result construction by the user. The user performs Lagrange interpolation on the received results, which provide an answer to the query.
DATA OUTSOURCING
This section provides details on creating and outsourcing a database of secret-shared form. The DB owner wishes to outsource a relation R having attributes A1, A2, . . . , Am and n tuples, and creates the following two relations R 1 and R 2 : • Relation R 1 that consists of all the attributes A1, A2, . . . , Am along with two additional attributes, namely TID (tuple-id) and Index. As will become clear in §7, the TID attribute will help in finding tuples having the maximum/minimum/top-k values, and the Index attribute will be used to know the tuples satisfying the query predicate. The i th values of the TID and Index attributes have the same and unique random number between 1 to n.
• Relation R 2 that consists of three attributes CTID (cleartext tuple-id), SSTID (secret-shared tuple-id), and an attribute, say Ac, on which a comparison operator (minimum, maximum, and top-k) needs to be supported. 7 The i th values of the attributes CTID and SSTID of the relation R 2 keep the i th value of the TID attribute of the relation R 1 . The i th value of the attributes Ac of the relation R 2 keeps the i th value of an attribute of the relation R 1 on which the user wants to execute a comparison operator. Further, the tuples of the relations R 2 are randomly permuted. The reason of doing permutation is that the adversary cannot relate any tuple of both the secret-shared relations, which will be clear soon by the example below. Note. The relation S(R 1 ) will be used to answer count and sum queries, while it will be clear in §7 how the user can use the two relations S(R 1 ) and S(R 2 ) together to fetch a tuple having maximum/minimum/top-k/reverse-top-k value in an attribute. Example. Consider the Employee relation (see Table 4 ). The DB owner creates R 1 = Employee1 relation 8 (see Table 5a ) with TID and Index attributes. Further, the DB owner creates R 2 = Employee2 relation (see Table 5b ) having three attributes CTID, SSTID, and Salary. 7 If there are x attributes on which comparison operators is executed, the DB owner creates x relations, each with attributes CTID, SSTID, and one of the x attributes. 8 For verifying results of count and sum queries, we add two more attributes to this relation. However, we do not show here, since verification is not a mandatory step. (a) R 1 = Employee1 relation.
CTID SSTID Salary  1  1  1500  5  5  5000  3  3  1000  6  6  2000  2  2  100000  4 4 2000
Creating secret-shares. Let Ai[aj] (1 ≤ i ≤ m+1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n) be the j th value of the attribute Ai. The DB owner creates c secretshares of each attribute value Ai[aj] of the relation R 1 using a secret-sharing mechanism that allows string-matching operations at the server (as specified in §2). However, c shares of the j th value of the attribute Am+2 (i.e., Index) are obtained using SSS. This will result in c relations:
secret-shared relation of R 1 at the server k. We use the notation Ai[S(aj)] k to indicate the j th secret-shared value of the i th attribute of a secret-shared relation at the server k.
Further, on the relation R 2 , the DB owner creates c secret-shares of each value of SSTID using a secret-sharing mechanism that allows string-matching operations on the servers and each value of Ac using order-preserving secret-sharing [25, 34, 26] . The secretshares of the relation R 2 are denoted by
The attribute CTID is outsourced in cleartext with the shared relation S(R 2 )i. It is important to mention that CTID attribute allows fast search due to cleartext representation than SSTID attribute, which allows search over shares.
Note that the DB owner's objective is to hide any relationship between the two relations when creating shares of the relations S(R 1 ) and S(R 2 ), i.e., the adversary cannot know by just observing any two tuples of the two relations that whether these tuples share a common value in the attribute TID/SSTID and Ac or not. Thus, shares of an i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of the attribute TID in the relation S(R 1 )j and in the attribute SSTID of the relation S(R 2 )j must be different at the j th server. Also, by default, the attribute Ac have different shares in both the relations, due to using different secret-sharing mechanisms for different attributes. The DB owner outsources the relations S(R 1 )i and S(R 2 )i to the i th server. Note. Naveed et al. [36] showed that a cryptographically secured database that is also using order-preserving cryptographic technique (e.g., OPE or OP-SS) may reveal the entire data when mixed with publicly known databases. Hence, in order to overcome such a vulnerability of order-preserving cryptographic techniques, we created two relations, and importantly, the above-mentioned representation, even though it uses OP-SS does not suffer from attacks based on background knowledge, as mentioned in §2. Of course, instead of using the two relations, the DB owner can outsource only a single relation without using OP-SS. In the case of a single relation, while we reduce the size of the outsourced dataset, we need to compare each pair of two shares, and it will result in increased communication cost and communication rounds, as shown in previous works [22, 15] , which were developed to compare two shares.
COUNT QUERY AND VERIFICATION
This section presents techniques to support count queries over secret-shared dataset outsourced by a single or multiple DB owners. The query execution does not involve the DB owner or the querier to answer the query. Further, we develop a method to verify the count query results. Conjunctive count query. Our conjunctive equality-based count query scans the entire relation only once for checking single/multiple conditions of the query predicate. Consider a conjunc-tive count query: select count( * ) from R where A1 = v1 ∧ A2 = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ Am = vm. The user transforms the query predicates to c secret-shares that result in the following query at the j th server: select count( * ) from S(R 1 )j where A1 = S(v1)j ∧ A2 = S(v2)j ∧ . . . ∧ Am = S(vm)j. Each server j performs the following operations:
shows a string-matching operation that depends on the underlying text representation. For example, if the text is represented as a unary vector, as explained in §2, ⊗ is a bit-wise multiplication and addition over a vector's elements, whose results will be 0 or 1 of secret-share form. Each server j compares the query predicate value S(vi) against k th value (1 ≤ k ≤ n) of the attribute Ai, multiplies all the resulting comparison for each of the attributes for the k th tuple. This will result in a single value for the k th tuple, and finally, the server adds all those values. Since secret-sharing allows the addition of two shares, the sum of all n resultant shares provides the occurrences of tuples that satisfy the query predicate of secret-share form in the relation S(R 1
th tuple produce 0 of secret-share form; thus, the k th tuple will not be included. Thus, the correct occurrences over all tuples are included that satisfy the query's where clause. Example. We explain the conjunctive count query method using the following query on the Employee relation (see Table 4 ):
select count( * ) from Employee where Name = 'John' and Salary = 1000. Table 6 shows the result of the private string-matching on the attribute Name, denoted by o1, and on the attribute Salary, denoted by o2. Finally, the last column shows the result of the query for each row and the final answer to the count query. Note that for the purpose of explanation, we use cleartext values; however, the server will perform all operations over secret-shares. For the first tuple, when the servers check the first value of Name attribute against the query predicate John and the first value of Salary attribute against the query predicate 1000, the multiplication of both the results of string-matching becomes 1. For the second tuple, when the server checks the second value of Name and Salary attributes against the query predicate John and 1000, respectively, the multiplication of both the results become 0. All the other tuples are processed in the same way. 
Disjunctive count query. Our disjunctive count query also scans the entire relation only once for checking multiple conditions of the query predicate. Consider a disjunctive count query: select count( * ) from R where A1 = v1 ∨ A2 = v2 ∨ . . . ∨ Am = vm. The user transforms the query predicates to c secretshares that results in the following query at the j th server: select count( * ) from S(R 1 )j where A1 = S(v1)j ∨ . . . ∨ Am = S(vm)j The server j performs the following operation:
Result
To capture the OR operation for each tuple k, the server generates m different results either 0 or 1 of secret-share form, denoted by Resulti (1 ≤ i ≤ m), each of which corresponds to the comparison for one attribute. To compute the final result of the OR operation for each tuple k, one can perform binary-tree style computation.
However, for simplicity, we used an iterative OR operation, as follows: temp
. . .
After performing the same operation on each tuple, finally, the server adds all the resultant of the OR operation ( k=n k=1 Output k ) and sends to the user. The user performs an interpolation on the received values that is the answer to the disjunctive count query. Correctness. The disjunctive counting operation counts only those tuples that satisfy one of the query predicates. Thus, by performing OR operation over string-matching resultants for an i th tuple results in 1 of secret-share form, if the tuple satisfied one of the query predicates. Thus, the sum of the OR operation resultant surely provides an answer to the query. Information leakage discussion. The user sends query predicates of secret-share form, and the string-matching operation is executed on all the values of the desired attribute. Hence, access-patterns are hidden from the adversary, so that the server cannot distinguish any query predicate in the count queries. The output of any count query is of secret-share form and contains an identical number of bits. Thus, based on the output size, the adversary cannot know the exact count, as well as, differentiate two count queries. However, the adversary can know whether the count query is single dimensional, conjunctive or disjunctive count query.
Verifying Count Query Results
In this section, we describe how results of count query can be verified. Note that we explain the algorithms only for a single dimensional query predicate. Conjunctive and disjunctive predicates can be handled in the same way.
Here, our objective is to verify that (i) all tuples of the databases are checked against the count query predicates, and (ii) all answers to the query predicate (0 or 1 of secret-share form) are included in the answer. In order to verify both the conditions, the server executes two functions, f1 and f2, as follows:
i.e., the server executes the functions f1 and f2 on n secret-shared values each (of two newly added attributes Ax and Ay, outsourced by the DB owner, described below). In the above equations, oi is the output of string-matching operation carried on the i th value of an attribute, say Aj, on which the user wants to execute the count query. The server sends the outputs of the function f1, denoted by op 1 , and the sum of the outputs of f1 and f2, denoted by op 2 , to the user. The outputs op 1 and op 2 ensure the count result verification and that the server has checked each tuple, respectively. The count query verification method works as follows: The DB owner. For enabling a count query result verification over any attribute, the DB owner adds two attributes, say Ax and Ay, having initialized with one, to the relation R 1 . The values of the attributes Ax and Ay are also outsourced of SSS form (not unary representations) to the servers. Server. Each server k executes the count query, as mentioned in §5, i.e., it executes the private string-matching operation on the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of the attribute Aj against the query predicate and adds all the resultant values. In addition, each server k executes the functions f1 and f2. The function f1 (and f2) multiplies the i th value of the Ax (and Ay) attribute by the i th string-matching resultant (and by the complement of the i th string-matching resultant). The server k sends the following three things: (i) the sum of the string-matching operation over the attribute Aj, as a result, say result k , of the count query, (ii) the outputs of the function f1: op 1 k , and (iii) the sum of outputs of the function f1 and f2: op 2 k , to the user. User-side. The user interpolates the received three values from each server, which result in Iresult, Iop 1 , and Iop 2 . If the server followed the algorithm, the user will obtain: Iresult = Iop 1 and Iop 2 = n, where n is the number of tuples in the relation, and it is known to the user. Example. We explain the above method using the following query on the Employee relation (refer to Table 4): select count( * ) from Employee where Name = 'John'. Table 7 shows the result of the private string-matching, functions f1 and f2 at a server. Note that for the purpose of explanation, we use cleartext values; however, the server will perform all operations over secret-shares. For the first tuple, when the servers check the first value of Name attribute against the query predicate, the result of string-matching becomes 1 that is multiplied by the first value of the attribute Ax, and results in 1. The complement of the resultant is multiplied by the first value of the attribute Ay, and results in 0. All the other tuples are processed in the same way. Note that for this query, result = op 1 = 2 and op 2 = 6, if server performs each operation correctly. Correctness. Consider two cases: (i) all servers discard an entire identical tuple for processing, or (ii) all servers correctly process each value of the attribute Aj, op 1 , and op 2 ; however, they do not add an identical resultant, oi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), of the string-matching operation. In the first case, the user finds Iresult = Iop 1 to be true. However, the second condition (Iop 2 = n) will never be true, since discarding one tuple will result in Iop 2 = n − 1. In the second case, the servers will send the wrong result by discarding an i th count query resultant, and they will also discard the i th value of the attribute Ax to produce Iresult = Iop 1 at the user-side. Here, the user, however, finds the second condition Iop 2 = n to be false. Thus, the above verification method correctly verifies the count query result, always, under the assumption of SSS that an adversary cannot collude all (or the majority of) the servers, as given in §3.2.
SUM AND AVERAGE QUERIES
The sum and average queries are based on the search operation, as mentioned above in the case of count queries. This section, briefly, presents sum and average queries on a secret-shared database outsourced by single or multiple DB owners. Then, we develop a result verification approach for sum queries. Conjunctive sum query. Consider a query: select sum(A ) from R where A1 = v1 ∧ A2 = v2 ∧ . . . ∧ Am = vm. In the secret-sharing setting, the user transforms the above query into the following query at the j th server: select sum(A ) from S(R 1 )j where A1 = S(v1)j ∧ A2 = S(v2)j ∧ . . . ∧ Am = S(vm)j. This query will be executed in a similar manner as conjunctive count query except for the difference that the i th resultant of matching the query predicate is multiplied by the i th values of the attribute A . The j th server performs the following operation on each attribute on which the user wants to compute the sum, i.e., A and Aq:
Correctness. The correctness of conjunctive sum queries is similar to the argument for the correctness of conjunctive count queries. Disjunctive sum query. Consider the following query: select sum(A ) from R where A1 = v1 ∨ A2 = v2 ∨ . . . ∨ Am = vm. The user transforms the query predicates to c secret-shares that results in the following query at the j th server:
The server j executes the following computation:
The server multiplies the k th comparison resultant by the k th value of the attribute, on which the user wants to execute the sum operation (e.g., A ), and then, adds all values of the attribute A .
Correctness. The correctness of a disjunctive sum query is similar to the correctness of a disjunctive count query. Average queries. In our settings, computing the average query is a combination of the counting and the sum queries. The user requests the server to send the count and the sum of the desired values, and the user computes the average at their end. Information leakage discussion. Sum queries work identically to count queries. Sum queries, like count queries, hide the facts which tuples are included in the sum operation, and the sum of the values.
Result Verification of Sum Queries
Now, we develop a result verification approach for a single dimensional sum query. The approach can be extended for conjunctive and disjunctive sum queries. Let A be an attribute whose values will be included by the following sum query. select sum(A ) from R where Aq = v.
Here, our objective is to verify that (i) all tuples of the databases are checked against the sum query predicates, Aq = v, and (ii) only all qualified values of the attribute A are included as an answer to the sum query. The verification of a sum query first verifies the occurrences of the tuples that qualify the query predicate, using the mechanism for count query verification ( §5.1). Further, the server computes two functions, f1 and f2, to verify both the conditions of sum-query verification in an oblivious manner, as follows:
i.e., the server executes the functions f1 and f2 on n values, described below. In the above equations, oi is the output of the stringmatching operation carried on the i th value of the attribute Aq, and ai be the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of the attribute A . The server sends the sum of the outputs of the function f1, denoted by op 1 , and the outputs of f2, denoted by op 2 , to the user. Particularly, the verification method for a sum query works as follows: The DB owner. Analogous with the count verification method, if the data owner wants to provide verification for sum queries, new attributes should be added. Thus, the DB owner adds two attributes, say Ax and Ay, to the relation R 1 . The i th values of the attributes Ax and Ay are any two random numbers whose difference equals to −ai, where ai is the i th value of the attribute A . The values of the attributes Ax and Ay are also secret-shared using SSS. For Table 8 : An execution of the sum query verification.
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Ax and f1 Ay and f2 example, in Table 8 , boldface numbers show these random numbers of the attribute Ax and Ay in cleartext. Servers. The servers execute the above-mentioned sum query, i.e., each server k executes the private string-matching operation on the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of the attribute Aq against the query predicate v and multiplies the resultant value by the i th value of the attribute A . The server k adds all the resultant values of the attributes A . Verification stage. The server k executes the functions f1 and f2 on each value xi and yi of the attributes Ax and Ay, by following the above-mentioned equations. Finally, the server k sends the following three things to the user: (i) the sum of the resultant values of the attributes A , say sum k , (ii) the sum of the output of the string-matching operations carried on the attribute Aq, say sumq k , 9 against the query predicate, and (iii) the sum of outputs of the functions f1 and f2, say sum f 1f 2 k . User-side. The user interpolates the received three values from each server, which results in Isum , Isumq, and Isum f 1f 2 . The user checks the value of Isum f 1f 2 − 2 × Isumq and Isum , and if it finds equal, the server has correctly executed the sum query. Example. We explain the above method using the following query on the Employee relation (refer to Table 4): select sum( * ) from Employee where Dept = 'Testing'. Table 8 shows the result of the private string-matching (o), the values of the attributes Ax and Ay in boldface, and the execution of the functions f1 and f2 at a server. Note that for the purpose of explanation, we show the verification operation in cleartext; however, the server will perform all operations over secret-shares.
For the first tuple, when the server checks the first value of Dept attribute against the query predicate, the string-matching resultant, o1, becomes 1 that is multiplied by the first value of the attribute Salary. Also, the server adds the salary of the first tuple to the first values of the attributes Ax and Ay with o1. Then, the server multiplies the summation outputs by o1.
For the second tuple, the servers perform the same operations, as did on the first tuple; however, the string-matching resultant o2 becomes 0, which results in the second values of the attributes Ax and Ay to be 0. The servers perform the same operations on the remaining tuples. Finally, the servers send the summation of oi (i.e., 2), the sum of the salaries of qualified tuples (i.e., 6000), and the sum of outputs of the functions f1 and f2 (i.e., 6004), to the user. Note that for this query, Isum f 1f 2 − 2 × Isumq = Isum , i.e., 6004 − 2 × 2 = 6000. Correctness. The occurrences of qualified tuples against a query predicates can be verified using the method given in §5.1. Consider two cases: (i) all servers discard an entire identical tuple for processing, or (ii) all servers correctly process the query predicate, but they discard the i th values of the attributes A , Ax, and Ay. The first case is easy to deal with, since the count query verification informs the user that an identical tuple is discarded by the server for any processing. In the second case, the user finds Isum f 1f 2 − 2 × Isumq = Isum , since an adversary cannot 9 If users are interested, they can also verify this result using the method given in §5.1.
provide a wrong value of Isumq, which is detected by count query verification. In order to hold the equation Isum f 1f 2 − 2 × Isumq = Isum , the adversary needs to generate shares such that Isum f 1f 2 −Isum = 2×Isumq, but an adversary cannot generate any share, as per the assumption of SSS that an adversary cannot produce a share, since it requires to collude with all (or the majority of) the servers, which is impossible due to the assumption of SSS, as mentioned in §3.2.
MAXIMUM QUERY
This section provides methods for finding the maximum value and retrieving the corresponding tuples for the two types of queries, where the first type of query (QMax1) SDBMax. In this section, we assume that Ac be an attribute of the relation S(R 1 ) on which the user wishes to execute maximum queries. Our idea is based on a combination of OP-SS [25, 34] and SSS [40, 23] techniques. Specifically, for answering maximum queries, SDBMax uses the two relations S(R 1 ) and S(R 2 ), which are secured using secret-shared and OP-SS, respectively, as explained in §3.1. In particular, according to our data model ( §3.1), the attribute Ac will exist in the relations S(R 1 )i and S(R 2 )i at the server i. The strategy is to jointly execute a query on the relations S(R 1 )i and S(R 2 )i and obliviously retrieve the entire tuple from S(R 1 )i. In this paper, due to space restrictions, we develop SDBMax for the case when only a single tuple has the maximum value; for example, in Employee relation (see Table 4 ), the maximum salary over all employees is unique.
Unconditional Maximum Query
Recall that by observing the shares of the attribute Ac of the relation S(R 1 ), the server cannot find the maximum value of the attribute Ac. However, the server can find the maximum value of the attribute Ac using the relation S(R 2 ), which is secret-shared using OP-SS. Thus, to retrieve a tuple having the maximum value in the attribute Ac of the relation S(R 1 )i, the i th server executes the following steps: 1. On the relation S(R 2 )i. Since the secret-shared values of the attribute Ac of the relation S(R 2 )i are comparable, the server i finds a tuple S(t k ), S(value) i having the maximum value in the attribute Ac, where S(t k )i is the k th secret-shared tuple-id (in the attribute SSTID) and S(value)i is the secret-shared value of the Ac attribute in the k th tuple. 2. On the relation S(R 1 )i. Now, the server i performs the join of the tuple S(t k ), S(value) i with all the tuples of the relation S(R 1 )i by comparing the tuple-ids (TID attribute's values) of the relation S(R 1 )i with S(t k )i, as follows:
is the number of attributes in the relation R and TID is the tuple-id attribute of S(R 1 )i. The server i compares the tuple-id S(t k ) i with each k th value of the attribute TID of S(R 1 )i and multiplies the resultant by the first m attribute values of the tuple k. The server i adds all the values of each m attribute. Correctness. The server i can find the tuple having the maximum value in the attribute Ac of the relation S(R 2 )i. Afterward, the comparison of the tuple-id S(t k )i with all the values of the TID attribute of the relation S(R 1 )i results in n − 1 zeros (when the tuple-ids do not match) and only one (when the tuple-ids match) of secret-share form. Further, the multiplication of the resultant (0 or 1 of secret-share form) by the entire tuple will leave only one tuple in the relation S(R 1 )i, which satisfies the query.
Information leakage discussion. The adversary will know only the order of the values, due to OP-SS implemented on the relation S(R 2 ). However, revealing only the order is not threatening, since the adversary may know the domain of the values, for example, the domain of age or salary. Recall that, as mentioned in §3.1, the relations S(R 1 ) and S(R 2 ) share attributes: TID/SSTID and Ac (the attribute on which a comparison operation will be carried). However, by just observing these two relations, the adversary cannot know any relationship between them, as well as, which tuple of the relation S(R 1 ) has the maximum value in the attribute Ac, due to different representations of common TID/SSTID and Ac values between the relations. Furthermore, after the above-mentioned maximum query (QMax1) execution, the adversary cannot learn which tuple of the relation S(R 1 ) has the maximum value in the attribute Ac, due to executing an identical operation on each tuple of S(R 1 ) when joining with a single tuple of S(R 2 ).
Conditional Maximum Query
The maximum value of the attribute Ac may be different from the Ac's maximum value of the tuple satisfying the where clause of a query. For example, in Employee relation, the maximum salary of the testing department is 2000, while the maximum salary of the employees is 100000. Thus, the method given for answering unconditional maximum queries is not applicable here. In the following, we provide a method to answer maximum queries that have conditional predicates (like QMax2), and that uses two communication rounds between the user and the servers, as follows: Round 1. The user obliviously knows the indexes of the relation S(R 1 ) satisfying the where clause of the query (the method for obliviously finding the indexes is given below). Round 2. The user interpolates the received indexes and sends the desired indexes in cleartext to the servers. Each server i finds the maximum value of the attribute Ac in the requested indexes by looking into the attribute CTID of the relation S(R 2 )i and results in a tuple, say S(t k ), S(value) i, where S(t k )i shows the secret-shared tuple-id (from SSTID attribute) and S(value)i shows the secret-shared maximum value. Now, the server i performs a join operation between all the tuples of S(R 1 )i and S(t k ), S(value) i, as performed when answering unconditional maximum (QMax1) queries; see §7.1. This operation results in a tuple that satisfies the conditional maximum query.
Note. The difference between the methods for answering unconditional and conditional maximum queries is that first we need to know the desired indexes of S(R 1 ) relation satisfying the where clause of a query in the case of conditional maximum queries. Correctness. The correctness of the above method can be argued in a similar way as the method for answering unconditional maximum queries. Information leakage discussion. In round 1, due to obliviously retrieving indexes of S(R 1 ), the adversary cannot know which tuples satisfy the query predicate. In round 2, the user sends only the desired indexes in cleartext to quickly find the maximum salary. Note that by sending indexes, the adversary learns the number of tuples that satisfies the query predicate; 11 however, the adversary cannot learn which tuples of the relation S(R 1 ) have those indexes. Due to OP-SS, the adversary also knows only the order of values of Ac attribute in the requested indexes. However, joining the tuple of S(R 2 ), which has the maximum value in Ac attribute, with all tuples of S(R 1 ) will not reveal which tuple satisfies the query predicate, as well as, have the maximum value in Ac. Aside: Hiding frequency-analysis in round 2 used for conditional maximum queries. In the above-mentioned round 2, the user reveals the number of tuples satisfying a query predicate. Now, below, we provide a method to hide frequency-count information: User-side. The user interpolates the received indexes (after round 1) and sends the desired indexes with some fake indexes, which do not satisfy the query predicate in the round 1, in cleartext to the servers. Let x = r + f be the indexes that are transmitted to the servers, where r and f be the real and fake indexes, respectively. Note that the maximum value of the attribute Ac over x tuples may be more than the maximum value over r tuples. Hence, the user does the following computation to appropriately send the indexes: The user arranges the x indexes in a √ x × √ x matrix, where all r real indexes appear before f fake indexes. Then, the user creates √ x groups of tuples ids, say g1, g2, . . . , g √ x , where all tuples ids in an i th row of the matrix become a part of the group gi. Note that in this case only one of the groups, say gmix , may contain both the real and fake indexes. Now, the user asks the server to find the maximum value of the attribute Ac in each group except for the group gmix and to fetch all √ x tuples of the group gmix . Server. For each group, gj, except the group gmix , each server i finds the maximum value of the attribute Ac by looking into the attribute CTID of the relation S(R 2 )i and results in a tuple, say S(t k ), S(value) i. Further, the server i fetches all √ x tuples of the group gmix . Then, the server i performs a join operation (based on the attribute TID and SSTID, as performed in the second step for answering unconditional maximum queries; see §7.1) between all the tuples of S(R 1 )i and 2 √ x − 1 tuples obtained from the relation S(R 2 ), and returns 2 √ x − 1 tuples to the user. The user finds the maximum value over the r real tuples. Note that 2 √ x − 1 tuples must satisfy a conditional maximum query; however, due to space restrictions, we do not prove this claim here.
Note that this method, on one hand, hides the frequency-count; on the other hand, it requires the servers and the user process more tuples than the method that reveals the frequency-count. Obliviously finding the indexes. For finding the indexes, each server k executes the following operation:
e., the server executes string-matching operations on each 
value of the desired attribute, say Ap, of the relation S(R 1 ) and checks the occurrence of the query predicate v. Then, the server k multiplies the i th resultant of the string-matching operation by the i th value of Index attribute of the relation S(R 1 ). Finally, the server sends all the n values of the attribute Index to the user, where n is the number of tuples in the relation. The user interpolates the received values and knows the desired indexes.
Verification of Maximum Query
Verifying only the maximum value of the tuple is trivial, since S(value) i of S(R 2 )i is also a part of the attribute of Ac of S(R 1 )i, and servers send a joined output of the relations (see step 2 in §7.1). Thus, servers cannot alter the maximum value. However, servers can alter other attribute values of the tuple. Thus, we provide a method to verify the received tuple. Verification of retrieved tuple. This method is an extension of the sum verification method (as given in §6.1). The server computes two functions, f1 and f2, in an oblivious manner, as follows:
i.e., the server executes the functions f1 and f2 on n values, described below. In the above equations, oi is the output of the stringmatching operation carried on the i th value of the TID attribute, and si,j be the i th (1 ≤ i ≤ n) value of the attribute j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The server sends the difference of the outputs of the functions f1 and f2 to the user. Particularly, the tuple verification method works as follows: The DB owner. The DB owner adds one value to each of the attribute values of a tuple along with new attributes, say Ax and Ay.
Let A1 be an attribute having only numbers. For A1 attribute, the newly added i th value in cleartext is same as the existing i th value in A1 attribute. Let A2 be an attribute having English alphabets, say attribute Name in Employee relation in Table 4 . The new value is the sum of the positions of each appeared alphabet in English letters; for example, the first value in the attribute Name is John, the DB owner adds 47 (10+15+8+14). When creating shares of the two values at the i th position of the attribute A1 or A2, the first value's shares are created using the mechanism that supports string-matching at the server, as mentioned in §2.1, and the second value's shares are created using SSS.
The i th values of the attributes Ax and Ay are two random numbers whose difference equals to −ai, where ai is the i th value obtained after summing all the newly added values to each attribute of the i th tuple. The values of the attributes Ax and Ay are secretshared using SSS. E.g., in Table 9 , numbers show newly added values to attributes Name , Dept , and random numbers (in boldface) of the attributes Ax and Ay in cleartext (a prime ( ) symbol is used to distinguish these values from the original attribute values). Servers. Each server k executes the method for tuple retrieval as given in step 2 in §7.1. Then, the server k executes functions f1 and f2, i.e., adds all the m newly added values (one in each attribute) to xi and yi of the attributes Ax and Ay, respectively, and then, multiply the resultant of the string-matching operation carried on TID attribute of the relation S(R 1 ) k . Finally, the server k sends the following two things to the user: (i) the tuple having the maximum value in the attribute Ac of the relation S(R 1 ) k ; and (ii) the difference of outputs of the functions f1 and f2, say diff f 1f 2 k .
User. After interpolation, the user obtains the desired tuple and a value, say Idiff f 1f 2 . Like the DB owner, the user generates a value for each of the attribute values of the received tuple (see the first step above for generating values), compares against Isum f 1f 2 , and if it finds equal, the server has correctly sent the tuple. Example. Table 9 shows verification process for the first tuple-id of employee relation; see Table 4 . Note that the values and computation are shown in the cleartext; however, the values are of secretshare form and the computation will be carried on shares at servers.
EXPERIMENTS
This section evaluates the scalability of OBSCURE and compares it against other SSS-and MPC-based systems. We used a 16GB RAM machine as a DB owner, as well as, a user that communicates with AWS servers. For our experiments, we used two types of AWS servers -a relatively weaker 32 GB, 2.5 GHz, Intel Xeon CPU (Exp 2, 5), and a powerful 144GB RAM, 3.0GHz Intel Xeon CPU with 72 cores to study impact of multi-threaded processing (Exp 3).
OBSCURE Evaluation
Secret-share (SS) dataset generation. We used four columns (Orderkey (OK), Partkey (PK), Linenumber (LN), and Suppkey(SK)) of LineItem table of TPC-H benchmark to generate 1M and 6M rows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such experiment of SSS-based approaches to such large datasets. We next explain the method followed to generate SS data for 1M rows. A similar method was used for generating SS data for 6M rows.
The four columns of LineItem table only contain numbers: OK: 1 to 300,000 (1,500,000 in 6M), PK: 1 to 40,000 (200,000 in 6M), LN: 1 to 7, and SK: 1 to 2000 (200,000 in 6M). The following steps are required to generate SS of the four columns in 1M rows: 1. The first step was to pad each number of each column with zeros.
Thus, all numbers in a column contain identical digits, preventing an adversary to know the distribution of values. E.g., after padding 1 of OK was 000,001. Similarly, values of PK and SK were padded. We did not pad LN values, since they took only one digit. 2. The second step was representing each digit into a set of ten numbers, as mentioned in §2.1, having only 0s or 1s. For example, 000,001 (one value of OK attribute) was converted into 60 numbers, having all zeros except at positions 1, 11, 21, 31, 41, and 52.
Here, a group of the first ten numbers shows the first digit, i.e., 0, a group of 11th to 20th number shows the second digit, i.e., 0, and so on. 12 Similarly, each value of PK, SK, and LN was converted. We also added columns for TID, Index, count, sum, and maximum verification, and it resulted in the relation R 1 . Further, we created another relation, R 2 , with three attributes CTID, SSTID, and OK, as mentioned in §4. 12 One may use binary representation for representing secret-shares, since it is compact as compared to unary representation. However, in binary representation, polynomial degree increases significantly, when we perform string-matching operations. For example, consider a decimal number, say n (= 400), having l d (= 3) digits in decimal, and takes l b (= 9) digits in binary (110010000). Here, representing 400 using unary and binary representations will take 30 and 9 numbers, respectively. However, when the user wishes to perform the minimum computation by interpolating only the desired answer, we need at least 2 × l d + 1 and 2 × l b + 1 servers for string-matching, when using unary and binary representation, respectively. Figure 1 : Exp 2. OBSCURE performance using a single-threaded implementation on 32GB RAM, 2.5GHz Intel Xeon CPU.
3. The third step was creating SS of these numbers. We selected a polynomial f (x) = secret value + a1x, where a1 was selected randomly between 1 to 10M for each number, the modulus is chosen as 15,000,017, and x was varied from one to fifteen to obtain fifteen shares of each value. On R 2 , we implemented OP-SS on OK attribute, and also generated fifteen shares of SSTID. Thus, we got S(R 1 )i and S(R 2 )i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15. (Exp 5 will discuss in detail why are we generating fifteen shares.) For sum and tuple retrieval queries' time minimization, we add four more attributes corresponding to each of the four attributes in LineItem table. A value of each of the four attributes has only one secret-shared value, created using SSS (not after padding). But, one can also implement the same query on secret-shared values obtained after step 2. 4. Lastly, we placed i th share of S(R 1 ) and S(R 2 ) to i th AWS server.
Exp 1. Data generation time. Table 10 shows the time to generate secret-shared LineItem table of 1M and 6M rows, at the DB owner machine. Note that due to unary representation, the size of the data is large; but, the data generation time of OBSCURE is significantly less than an MPC system, which will be discussed in §8.2. Exp 2. OBSCURE performance on a single-threaded implementation. This experiment explores OBSCURE on a relatively weaker single-threaded machine with 32GB. We chose this machine since (as will be clear in §8.2) the used MPC system can only work on a local single-threaded machine. To be able to compare against that we also execute OBSCURE on 32GB AWS servers. Note that single-threaded implementation of OBSCURE incurs time overheads, which are significantly reduced when using many threads on powerful servers; see next Exp 3. We executed count, sum, unconditional and conditional maximum queries on the LineItem table having 1M and 6M rows using fifteen shares; see Figure 1 . Note that as the size of data increases, the time increases slightly more than linearly. This is due to the unary representation that requires 10 more numbers (for 6M rows table) to cover one new additional digit in all attribute values (except LN attribute). This increase results in additional multiplications during string-matching. Count and sum queries. Figure 1 shows the time taken by one-dimensional (1D), two/three-dimensional conjunctiveequality (2CE/3CE), and two/three-dimensional disjunctiveequality (2DE/3DE) count and sum queries. CE queries were executed on OK and LN, and DE queries involved OK, PK, and LN attributes. Observe that as the number of predicates increases, the computation time also increases, due to an increasing number of multiplications. The time difference between computations on 1M and 6M rows is about 6-7.4%. Maximum queries. Figure 1 shows that determining only the maximum value is efficient due to OP-SS, in case of unconditional maximum queries (UnC-Max-Det, QMax1, see §7). Time for determining the maximum value for conditional (Cond-Max-Det) query requires first executing a query similar to 1D/CE/DE sum query. We executed 1D conditional maximum query. The time is slightly more than executing 1D sum query, since Cond-Max-Det requires to know the tuple-ids that satisfy the condition in relation S(R 1 ), and then, determining the maximum value from S(R 2 ). Note that in both UnC-Max-Det and Cond-Max-Det, we achieve the maximum efficiently, due to OP-SS, (while also preventing backgroundknowledge-based attacks on OP-SS). The time difference between fetching a tuple having the maximum value from 1M and 6M data is about 5.5-6.6%. Exp 3. OBSCURE performance on multi-threaded implementation. In OBSCURE, the processing time at each server can be greatly reduced by parallelizing the computation. Since identical computations are executed on each row of the table, we can use multiple cores of CPU by writing a parallel program, which reduces the processing time. We wrote parallel programs (for 1D count/sum, 3DE count/sum, and unconditional maximum queries) that divide rows into blocks with one thread processing one block, and then, the intermediate results (generated by each thread) are reduced by the master thread to produce the final result. For this experiment having 15 shares, we used AWS servers with 144GB RAM, 3.0GHz Intel Xeon CPU with 72 cores, and varied the degree of parallelism up to 48 (number of parallel threads). Increasing more threads did not provide speed-up, since the execution time reached close to the time spent in the sequential part of the program (Amdahl's law); furthermore, the execution time increases due to thread maintenance overheads. Figure 2 shows as the number of threads increases, the computation time decreases. Observe that the data fetch time from the database remains (almost) same and less than the processing time. Also, the computation time reduces significantly due to using many threads on powerful servers (Figure 2 ), than using a single thread on weaker servers (see Figure 1) . Exp 4. Impact of local processing at a resource-constrained user. To show the practicality of OBSCURE, we did an experiment, where a resource-constrained user downloads the entire encrypted . Impact of the number of shares. data and executes the computation at their end after decrypting the data and loading into a database system. We restricted the user to have a machine with 1GB RAM and single core 1.35GHz CPU using docker, unlike multicore servers used in Exp 3, and executed the same queries that we executed in Exp 3. With this setup, decryption time at the user side was 54s and 259s for 1M and 6M rows, respectively. Further, loading decrypted data into a database system (MySQL) at the user-side took 20s and 120s for 1M and 6M rows, respectively. All queries used in Exp 2 were executed in 1-5s for both 1M and 6M rows. Note that the user computation time is significantly higher compared to the computation time of queries in Exp 3. For example, end-to-end 1D count query execution in Exp 3 over 6M secret-shared rows took 26s (see Figure 2b) , while the same query took 385s when decrypting and loading the data into MySQL at the resource-constrained user. Exp 5. Impact of the number of shares. Now, we discuss the impact of a different number of shares. For this experiment, we used 3, 5, 11, and 15 shares of the data. We show results of 1M rows. Figure 3 shows the computation time at the server and user, when having different shares, where black and white parts show the computation time at the user and server, respectively, and a bar shows the entire processing time. The results demonstrate two tradeoffs: between the number of shares and computation time at a user, and between the number of shares and the amount of data transferred from a server to a user. As the number of shares decreases, the computation time at the user increases; since the string-matching operation results in the polynomial degree to be doubled, and if servers do not have enough shares, they cannot compute the final answer and may require more than one round of communication with the user to compute the final SS aggregate value. Thus, the communication cost also increases.
From Figure 3 , it is clear that as the number of shares increases, the computation time at user decreases and at the server increases. The total processing time also decreases for all queries, except 1D-Count, 2CE-Count, 1D-Sum, and 2CE-Sum. Due to space restrictions, we do not provide a detailed description of Figure 3 , which is discussed in the full version of the paper [32] . Exp 6. Impact of communication cost. An interesting point was the impact of the communication cost. Since servers send data to the user over the network, it may affect the overall performance. As mentioned in Exp 4., using 3 servers, the communication cost increases as compared to 15 servers. For instance, in executing DE count/sum queries over PK, LN, and OK attributes took the highest amount of data transfer when using 3 servers. Since the number of digits of the three predicates was 12 in 1M rows and 14 in 6M rows, each server sends 12 files (each of size 7MB) in case of 1M rows and 14 files (each of size 48MB). Hence, the server to user communication was 84MB/server in case of 1M rows and 672MB/server in case of 6M rows. However, in case of 15 servers, the server to user communication was 7MB/server in case of 1M rows and 48MB/server in case of 6M rows. When using slow (100MB/s), medium (500MB/s), and fast (1GB/s) speed of data transmission, the data transmission time in case of 15 servers was negligible.
However, in case of 6M, it took 7s, 1s, less than 1s per server, respectively, on slow, medium, and fast transmission speed.
Observe that the computation time at the server was at most 47s in any query on 6M rows (when using 72 core servers; Figure 2b ) that was significantly more than the communication time between user and servers. Thus, the communication time does not affect the servers's computation time, which was the bottleneck. Note. Experiments on result verification are omitted from here due to space restrictions and are given in [32] .
Comparing with Other Works
The previous works on SSS-based techniques either did not report any experiments [25, 23] or scaled to only a very small dataset, or used techniques that, while efficient, were insecure [26, 45] . For instance, [26, 45] are both vulnerable to access-pattern attacks. Furthermore, these approaches achieve efficient query processing times (e.g., 90 ms for aggregation queries on databases of size 150K) by executing queries on SS data identically to that on cleartext, which requires user sides to retain polynomials that were used to generate SS-data. Thus, as mentioned in §2.2, the DB owner keeps n × m polynomials, where n and m are the number of tuples and attributes in a relation, respectively.
MPC-based methods, e.g., [15, 14, 10, 13] , are secure; however, they also do not scale to large datasets due to high overhead of share creation and/or query execution. For example, MPC-based Sepia [15] used 65K values for only count operation without any condition with the help of three to nine servers, and recent paper [14] used only 500K values for count and sum of numbers. Note that Sepia [15] and [14] do not support conjunctive/disjunctive count/sum queries.
We evaluated one of the state-of-the-art industrial MPC-based systems, called system Z to get a better sense of its performance compared to OBSCURE, whose performance is given in Figure 1 . We note that MPC systems, as mentioned in §1, are not available as open source (and often not even available for purchase, except in the context of a contract). We were able to gain access to System Z, due to our ongoing collaboration with the team under the anonymity understanding. We installed system Z (having three SS of LineItem) on a local machine, since it was not allowed to install it on AWS. Also, note that we cannot directly compare system Z and OBSCURE, since system Z uses a single machine to keep all three shares. Inserting 1M rows in system Z took 9 hours, while the size of SS data was 1GB. We executed the same queries using the system Z, which took the following time: 532s for 1D count, 808s for CE count, 1099s for DE count, 531s for 1D sum, 801s for CE sum, 1073s for DE sum, 2205s for UnC-Max-Tuple-Fetch, and 2304s for Cond-Max-Tuple-Fetch.
CONCLUSION
We proposed information-theoretically secure and communication efficient aggregation queries (count, sum, and maximum having single dimensional, conjunctive, or disjunctive query predicates) on a secret-shared dataset outsourced by either a single DB or multiple DB owners. We proposed efficient result verification algorithms to protect against malicious adversarial cloud servers that deviate from the algorithm, due to software/hardware bugs. Our experimental results on 1M rows and 6M secret-shared rows using AWS servers show better performance as compared a simple strategy of downloading encrypted data, decrypting, and then, executing the query at a resource-constrained user. Further, we showed a tradeoff between the number of shares and performance. In the future, we plan to extend this work on GPU-based efficient join and nested queries.
